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Wednesday, October 24, 2012
The Windows 8 Muddle
This isn't shaping up to be the transcendent week that Microsoft wanted it to be. The Windows 8 announcement isn't a failure by any means, but the coverage is a lot more mixed and confused than I'm sure Microsoft would have liked. That's partly due to some clever marketing by Microsoft's competitors, and partly due to some mistakes made by Microsoft itself.
The situation all came together for me this morning when I did a brief appearance on Bloomberg TV, a cable business channel in the US. The segment was supposed to cover the new iPad Mini and Windows 8, with equal time given to each one. The Bloomberg folks spent time with me yesterday prepping the questions on each subject.
The equal billing of iPad Mini with Windows 8 is itself bad news for Microsoft. Windows 8 represents the reinvention of Microsoft, one of the biggest changes the company has ever made. The iPad Mini is a follow-on product in the iPad line. It's a very nice follow-on, and probably one that will sell very well, but it's not at the same level of importance as Windows 8. However, hardware gets more attention in the tech press than software. It's more tangible, and people react to it emotionally. So the Mini jumped right into the mix.
Apple very cleverly timed the Mini announcement a couple of days before the formal Windows 8 rollout, distracting the press from Microsoft's story. It reminds me a bit of the way the iPhone rumors undercut the Microsoft Zune launch in late 2006.
Leaking Flagship
Even with the competitive game-playing, Microsoft's announcement should have been OK. But then Microsoft failed to ship the Intel-compatible "Pro" version of its new Surface tablet on time. Instead, the only Surface device being reviewed right now is the Windows RT version, which can't run existing Windows software. Since Surface is the Windows 8 flagship, and hardware gets more coverage than software anyway, the concerns about Windows compatibility in Surface RT are dominating a lot of Windows 8 press coverage.
One of the most biting Surface reviews was David Pogue's in the New York Times, who compared Surface to owning "a new Ferrari...that has to be refueled every three miles." (link). PC Magazine called it "a disaster" (link). You can see more reviews summarized here.
There's an answer to the concerns about Surface RT: wait and buy the pro version. But the last thing a vendor wants to do right before the December buying season is tell customers not to buy. You'll hurt sales of not just Surface RT, but all other Windows 8 products as well. So Microsoft can't push that message aggressively. (Hey, Microsoft -- you say you want to be a device company? Lesson No. 1 is that you have to ship your high-end flagship product before Christmas, not right after it.)
The Windows 8 muddle was in full play for the Bloomberg segment, which started with video of Bloomberg's Sara Silverstein and Gizmodo's Sam Biddle trying to use Excel on Surface. Sara tries and fails to copy a formula using the touchscreen. Sam tells her Microsoft claims you can use all of Excel in the touch version. Sara replies sarcastically, "I believe that you would...if you're making a spreadsheet about, you know, lemonade stands" (link).
Then the segment jumps to the iPad Mini, with a discussion of how it stacks up against Amazon's subsidized tablet hardware. That's a great topic, and deserves a lot of thought. In fact, it goes on so long that Bloomberg runs out of time and never comes back to Windows 8 (link). So Apple and Amazon steal most of the oxygen, and the only impression you get about Windows 8 is that it's not ready for serious business use.
Not all the Windows 8 coverage is negative. For example, Walt Mossberg did a nicely balanced piece on All Things D (link), and Wired was pretty positive about Surface (link). But the story of Windows 8 is complicated. In a world of quick sound bites, it's very easy for the press to caricature Windows 8 as "that touch screen thing that doesn't run your stuff properly." Clever marketing by Apple is giving Microsoft less time in the press to explain the nuances of Windows 8, and the failure to ship Surface Pro on time makes Microsoft's job even tougher. Microsoft has enough money to wait out the bad coverage, but I think it's less and less likely that Windows 8 will deliver the massive initial sales that Microsoft promised for it.
The situation all came together for me this morning when I did a brief appearance on Bloomberg TV, a cable business channel in the US. The segment was supposed to cover the new iPad Mini and Windows 8, with equal time given to each one. The Bloomberg folks spent time with me yesterday prepping the questions on each subject.
The equal billing of iPad Mini with Windows 8 is itself bad news for Microsoft. Windows 8 represents the reinvention of Microsoft, one of the biggest changes the company has ever made. The iPad Mini is a follow-on product in the iPad line. It's a very nice follow-on, and probably one that will sell very well, but it's not at the same level of importance as Windows 8. However, hardware gets more attention in the tech press than software. It's more tangible, and people react to it emotionally. So the Mini jumped right into the mix.
Apple very cleverly timed the Mini announcement a couple of days before the formal Windows 8 rollout, distracting the press from Microsoft's story. It reminds me a bit of the way the iPhone rumors undercut the Microsoft Zune launch in late 2006.
Leaking Flagship
Even with the competitive game-playing, Microsoft's announcement should have been OK. But then Microsoft failed to ship the Intel-compatible "Pro" version of its new Surface tablet on time. Instead, the only Surface device being reviewed right now is the Windows RT version, which can't run existing Windows software. Since Surface is the Windows 8 flagship, and hardware gets more coverage than software anyway, the concerns about Windows compatibility in Surface RT are dominating a lot of Windows 8 press coverage.
One of the most biting Surface reviews was David Pogue's in the New York Times, who compared Surface to owning "a new Ferrari...that has to be refueled every three miles." (link). PC Magazine called it "a disaster" (link). You can see more reviews summarized here.
There's an answer to the concerns about Surface RT: wait and buy the pro version. But the last thing a vendor wants to do right before the December buying season is tell customers not to buy. You'll hurt sales of not just Surface RT, but all other Windows 8 products as well. So Microsoft can't push that message aggressively. (Hey, Microsoft -- you say you want to be a device company? Lesson No. 1 is that you have to ship your high-end flagship product before Christmas, not right after it.)
The Windows 8 muddle was in full play for the Bloomberg segment, which started with video of Bloomberg's Sara Silverstein and Gizmodo's Sam Biddle trying to use Excel on Surface. Sara tries and fails to copy a formula using the touchscreen. Sam tells her Microsoft claims you can use all of Excel in the touch version. Sara replies sarcastically, "I believe that you would...if you're making a spreadsheet about, you know, lemonade stands" (link).
Then the segment jumps to the iPad Mini, with a discussion of how it stacks up against Amazon's subsidized tablet hardware. That's a great topic, and deserves a lot of thought. In fact, it goes on so long that Bloomberg runs out of time and never comes back to Windows 8 (link). So Apple and Amazon steal most of the oxygen, and the only impression you get about Windows 8 is that it's not ready for serious business use.
Not all the Windows 8 coverage is negative. For example, Walt Mossberg did a nicely balanced piece on All Things D (link), and Wired was pretty positive about Surface (link). But the story of Windows 8 is complicated. In a world of quick sound bites, it's very easy for the press to caricature Windows 8 as "that touch screen thing that doesn't run your stuff properly." Clever marketing by Apple is giving Microsoft less time in the press to explain the nuances of Windows 8, and the failure to ship Surface Pro on time makes Microsoft's job even tougher. Microsoft has enough money to wait out the bad coverage, but I think it's less and less likely that Windows 8 will deliver the massive initial sales that Microsoft promised for it.
Wednesday, October 3, 2012
"Social" as a Business Tool, and Richard Windsor Unchained
I'd like to call your attention to two new information resources on the web.
"Social" as a business tool. First, my friend and former colleague Nilofer Merchant has written an ebook on the role of "social" tools in business strategy and operations. It's called "11 Rules for Creating Value in the Social Era," and is published through Harvard Business Review. In the book, Nilofer addresses a flaw in thinking that we saw in many businesses while we were consulting at Rubicon: when you say "social," most established companies think of a new medium for marketing their products, like a new form of advertising. So they assign social responsibility to their marketing team, and treat it as a method to shove one-way messages into the eyes and ears of customers.
But some companies, especially startups, are learning to integrate the full range of what we call "social" tools deeply into all of their business processes and decision-making. It requires a fundamental rethinking of everything you expect a business to do. To give you one very minor example from the startup I'm involved in, when you have a small team and Skype, do you really need to pay for office space and the time involved in commuting every day? Do you even need all your team members to live in the same country?
It sounds simple to folks who live online, but you'd be amazed by how hard it is for an established company, even a tech company, to rethink its business processes.
Nilofer's book is, as she says, a "quick read" designed to help you rethink business from a social perspective. You can learn more here.
Richard Windsor Unchained. In this age of tweets and shared videos, I'm delighted to see a new old-fashioned blog on the mobile industry. Richard Windsor has been for a long time one of my favorite financial analysts covering mobile. His short bullet-point e-mails analyzing earnings reports were always pungent and on-point, and since he's based in London he's outside the Silicon Valley groupthink. Richard recently left Nomura and is now free to share his opinions online, in a new blog here.
An excerpt from his recent comments on RIM:
"• RIMM also managed to grow the subscriber base by 2m to 80m but the mix and quality of these subscribers is falling fast despite this quarter’s blip.
• Out go the high spending corporate executives spending $100+ per month and in come the teenage texters in Indonesia spending more like $5 a month."
Yup.
"Social" as a business tool. First, my friend and former colleague Nilofer Merchant has written an ebook on the role of "social" tools in business strategy and operations. It's called "11 Rules for Creating Value in the Social Era," and is published through Harvard Business Review. In the book, Nilofer addresses a flaw in thinking that we saw in many businesses while we were consulting at Rubicon: when you say "social," most established companies think of a new medium for marketing their products, like a new form of advertising. So they assign social responsibility to their marketing team, and treat it as a method to shove one-way messages into the eyes and ears of customers.
But some companies, especially startups, are learning to integrate the full range of what we call "social" tools deeply into all of their business processes and decision-making. It requires a fundamental rethinking of everything you expect a business to do. To give you one very minor example from the startup I'm involved in, when you have a small team and Skype, do you really need to pay for office space and the time involved in commuting every day? Do you even need all your team members to live in the same country?
It sounds simple to folks who live online, but you'd be amazed by how hard it is for an established company, even a tech company, to rethink its business processes.
Nilofer's book is, as she says, a "quick read" designed to help you rethink business from a social perspective. You can learn more here.
Richard Windsor Unchained. In this age of tweets and shared videos, I'm delighted to see a new old-fashioned blog on the mobile industry. Richard Windsor has been for a long time one of my favorite financial analysts covering mobile. His short bullet-point e-mails analyzing earnings reports were always pungent and on-point, and since he's based in London he's outside the Silicon Valley groupthink. Richard recently left Nomura and is now free to share his opinions online, in a new blog here.
An excerpt from his recent comments on RIM:
"• RIMM also managed to grow the subscriber base by 2m to 80m but the mix and quality of these subscribers is falling fast despite this quarter’s blip.
• Out go the high spending corporate executives spending $100+ per month and in come the teenage texters in Indonesia spending more like $5 a month."
Yup.
Friday, September 28, 2012
The Unanswered Question About Apple Maps
I agree with almost everyone else that Tim Cook was right to quickly apologize for the problems with Apple Maps. If you're in the US, you can contrast his handling of the situation to the National Football League's handling of its referee lockout. The lesson: Deny a problem and the public will feed on you like wolves on a crippled buffalo. Acknowledge the problem and people will give you a second chance. The apology is especially effective if it comes from a person (not a corporate statement) and sounds sincere. Most of us want to be nice to one another, and a personal apology taps into that reflex.
So fine, I'm sure Apple will fix the app eventually, and in six months this whole thing will probably be a distant memory.
What I'm wondering about is a much more serious problem that may not be solved in six months, and that (unlike the Maps app itself) threatens Apple's long-term prosperity. The question:
How in the world did Apple make a mistake like this in the first place?
I'm not talking about shipping an unsatisfying app; that happens to any company. I'm talking about making an obviously underwhelming and unfinished app a centerpiece in a critically important new product announcement. If you have an app that isn't perfect yet, position it that way. Tell people that it's just getting started and needs more work. Instead, Apple execs gushed about Maps on stage. Scott Forstall made it the first feature in his iOS 6 demo, and spent more than two and a half minutes talking about it (link). This sort of mismatch between message and delivery is a sign that Apple's product management and review process failed utterly somewhere along the line.
It's a little bit like NASA launching the space shuttle Challenger when people in the organization knew it might blow up. The issue is not that there were flaws, it's that they went ahead with the launch despite the flaws.
Of course nobody has been killed by Apple Maps, so it's a very different sort of problem. But both are related to organizational culture and business practices. Like NASA's culture of safety, Apple is supposed to have a culture of great product functionality. It's the center of what makes the company special. That process failed spectacularly in the case of Apple Maps, and speaking as somebody who spent years reporting into the product management organization at Apple, there is absolutely no excuse for what happened.
Apple's marketing machine is so powerful that any major failure in a marquee feature gets magnified enormously. Even Google can probably get away with a big feature failure or two; you expect Android to be a bit loose around the edges, and lord knows Google backtracks on initiatives all the time. But Apple claims that it will amaze and delight us with its new products, and so people naturally expect greatness. It's what justifies the intense coverage of Apple's announcements.
There are several possible explanations for what went wrong, all of them bad. Maybe:
--The product managers on Apple Maps knew it had problems but didn't think users would care. Or
--The managers of Apple Maps knew there were problems, and reported the problems, but were ignored by middle management. Or
--The middle managers reported the problems, but senior management ignored them. Or
--Maybe Apple has become so insular and self-satisfied that no one there realized the difference between a good looking maps app and a usable one.
It comes down to this: are you incompetent, bureaucratic, or out of touch?
Screw-ups like this happened occasionally at Apple under Steve Jobs. Someone once described to me the experience of being in a group that was pulled into a meeting with Steve where he said, "you let me down, and you let the company down." My friend said it was one of the worst feelings ever, and it also resulted in job changes for the people responsible. That may be something Tim Cook will need to do. But he also needs to ask some deeper questions. Is this just a failure of a particular manager or team, or is there a cultural or process problem that needs to be fixed? That's a very tough question to answer. You don't want to mess up the culture and practices that Steve left behind, but at the same time you can't permit this sort of mistake to become a routine event.
When I was at Apple back in the 1990s, before Steve returned, we had a joke we told on ourselves:
Q: What's the difference between an Apple salesman and a used-car salesman?
A: The used car salesman knows when he's lying.
Apple needs to be sure it doesn't slip back into that old habit.
So fine, I'm sure Apple will fix the app eventually, and in six months this whole thing will probably be a distant memory.
What I'm wondering about is a much more serious problem that may not be solved in six months, and that (unlike the Maps app itself) threatens Apple's long-term prosperity. The question:
How in the world did Apple make a mistake like this in the first place?
I'm not talking about shipping an unsatisfying app; that happens to any company. I'm talking about making an obviously underwhelming and unfinished app a centerpiece in a critically important new product announcement. If you have an app that isn't perfect yet, position it that way. Tell people that it's just getting started and needs more work. Instead, Apple execs gushed about Maps on stage. Scott Forstall made it the first feature in his iOS 6 demo, and spent more than two and a half minutes talking about it (link). This sort of mismatch between message and delivery is a sign that Apple's product management and review process failed utterly somewhere along the line.
It's a little bit like NASA launching the space shuttle Challenger when people in the organization knew it might blow up. The issue is not that there were flaws, it's that they went ahead with the launch despite the flaws.
Of course nobody has been killed by Apple Maps, so it's a very different sort of problem. But both are related to organizational culture and business practices. Like NASA's culture of safety, Apple is supposed to have a culture of great product functionality. It's the center of what makes the company special. That process failed spectacularly in the case of Apple Maps, and speaking as somebody who spent years reporting into the product management organization at Apple, there is absolutely no excuse for what happened.
Apple's marketing machine is so powerful that any major failure in a marquee feature gets magnified enormously. Even Google can probably get away with a big feature failure or two; you expect Android to be a bit loose around the edges, and lord knows Google backtracks on initiatives all the time. But Apple claims that it will amaze and delight us with its new products, and so people naturally expect greatness. It's what justifies the intense coverage of Apple's announcements.
There are several possible explanations for what went wrong, all of them bad. Maybe:
--The product managers on Apple Maps knew it had problems but didn't think users would care. Or
--The managers of Apple Maps knew there were problems, and reported the problems, but were ignored by middle management. Or
--The middle managers reported the problems, but senior management ignored them. Or
--Maybe Apple has become so insular and self-satisfied that no one there realized the difference between a good looking maps app and a usable one.
It comes down to this: are you incompetent, bureaucratic, or out of touch?
Screw-ups like this happened occasionally at Apple under Steve Jobs. Someone once described to me the experience of being in a group that was pulled into a meeting with Steve where he said, "you let me down, and you let the company down." My friend said it was one of the worst feelings ever, and it also resulted in job changes for the people responsible. That may be something Tim Cook will need to do. But he also needs to ask some deeper questions. Is this just a failure of a particular manager or team, or is there a cultural or process problem that needs to be fixed? That's a very tough question to answer. You don't want to mess up the culture and practices that Steve left behind, but at the same time you can't permit this sort of mistake to become a routine event.
When I was at Apple back in the 1990s, before Steve returned, we had a joke we told on ourselves:
Q: What's the difference between an Apple salesman and a used-car salesman?
A: The used car salesman knows when he's lying.
Apple needs to be sure it doesn't slip back into that old habit.
Friday, September 21, 2012
Judging Apple: It's Really (Still) About Steve
It's been interesting to watch the passionate reactions flow back and forth about Apple's iPhone 5 announcement. Most of them fall into two camps:
-Apple is failing. The announcement was a boring disappointment, Apple is falling behind on features, and its execution is deteriorating. Just look at the mapping app in iOS 6.
Or
-The Apple haters don't get it. Look at the huge sales, Apple has always focused on functionality over feature list, and you have no idea how impressive it is that they packed that much circuitry into something so thin and elegant (link). Oh, and that map thing is a tactical retreat to get a better long-term future.
Both sides have some valid points, but I think what's driving the peculiar energy in the debate is a question that almost no one's putting on the table, and that no one can answer yet: Can Apple without Steve Jobs still put lightning in a bottle? Can it come up with that new category-busting product, like the iPhone and iPad, that overturns whole industries and makes us all nod our heads and say, "yes, of course, that's how the future should be"?
I think the Apple defenders generally believe that Apple can do it, and judge the current announcements as the normal incremental steps Apple takes between product revolutions. The Apple critics don't take it for granted, and are studying each announcement for signs of bottled lightning. When they don't get it, they feel uneasy, and that colors their comments.
The reality is that we don't know what the new Apple is capable of. It's unfair (and unrealistic) to expect magic in every announcement. The market can't absorb that much change, and no single company can produce it. But until Apple rolls out a new category-changing product, we can't know if it is truly the same power it was before Steve died.
Apple today is huge, rich company run by a bunch of middle-aged white guys who drive very expensive cars (link). Like any company run by a homogenous team with low turnover, it makes them potentially vulnerable to getting out of touch with the real world. That was also pretty much true before Steve died, but most people trusted that he had the mystical power of product design that enabled him to discern new product categories and make brilliant decisions about feature trade-offs. We don't know if his acolytes can do that. Is there a process for brilliance, or did that pass away with the founder?
When Apple made mistakes in the past, people trusted that it was an aberration that Steve would soon fix. Now when there's a mistake, I think there's fear in many minds that this isn't an aberration, it's the new normal for Apple; that the company is turning into a big successful outfit that often does good incremental work but also makes big glaring errors because of inertia or internal politics, and is too self-absorbed to see them before they go splat in public -- like the abortive decision to withdraw from Epeat green certification (link), like the rescinded staffing changes in the Apple stores (link), and like the mapping situation.
Apple's success makes it a target for huge, powerful competitors: Samsung, Google, Microsoft, and others. Its ultimate defense has always been its ability to change the rules, to alter the competitive landscape in ways that put the other guys at a lasting disadvantage. If Apple has lost its ability to change the world, the fear is that it'll become the business equivalent of the battleship Bismarck: a stationary target as more and more business firepower is concentrated against it.
We don't yet know what the new Apple can really do, and it'll take another two years or so to find out for sure. Until then, we should expect the passionate debate between the faithful and the skeptics to be renewed every time Apple announces anything. Just keep in mind that the debate won't really be about the products. It'll really be about Steve.
-Apple is failing. The announcement was a boring disappointment, Apple is falling behind on features, and its execution is deteriorating. Just look at the mapping app in iOS 6.
Or
-The Apple haters don't get it. Look at the huge sales, Apple has always focused on functionality over feature list, and you have no idea how impressive it is that they packed that much circuitry into something so thin and elegant (link). Oh, and that map thing is a tactical retreat to get a better long-term future.
Both sides have some valid points, but I think what's driving the peculiar energy in the debate is a question that almost no one's putting on the table, and that no one can answer yet: Can Apple without Steve Jobs still put lightning in a bottle? Can it come up with that new category-busting product, like the iPhone and iPad, that overturns whole industries and makes us all nod our heads and say, "yes, of course, that's how the future should be"?
I think the Apple defenders generally believe that Apple can do it, and judge the current announcements as the normal incremental steps Apple takes between product revolutions. The Apple critics don't take it for granted, and are studying each announcement for signs of bottled lightning. When they don't get it, they feel uneasy, and that colors their comments.
The reality is that we don't know what the new Apple is capable of. It's unfair (and unrealistic) to expect magic in every announcement. The market can't absorb that much change, and no single company can produce it. But until Apple rolls out a new category-changing product, we can't know if it is truly the same power it was before Steve died.
Apple today is huge, rich company run by a bunch of middle-aged white guys who drive very expensive cars (link). Like any company run by a homogenous team with low turnover, it makes them potentially vulnerable to getting out of touch with the real world. That was also pretty much true before Steve died, but most people trusted that he had the mystical power of product design that enabled him to discern new product categories and make brilliant decisions about feature trade-offs. We don't know if his acolytes can do that. Is there a process for brilliance, or did that pass away with the founder?
When Apple made mistakes in the past, people trusted that it was an aberration that Steve would soon fix. Now when there's a mistake, I think there's fear in many minds that this isn't an aberration, it's the new normal for Apple; that the company is turning into a big successful outfit that often does good incremental work but also makes big glaring errors because of inertia or internal politics, and is too self-absorbed to see them before they go splat in public -- like the abortive decision to withdraw from Epeat green certification (link), like the rescinded staffing changes in the Apple stores (link), and like the mapping situation.
Apple's success makes it a target for huge, powerful competitors: Samsung, Google, Microsoft, and others. Its ultimate defense has always been its ability to change the rules, to alter the competitive landscape in ways that put the other guys at a lasting disadvantage. If Apple has lost its ability to change the world, the fear is that it'll become the business equivalent of the battleship Bismarck: a stationary target as more and more business firepower is concentrated against it.
We don't yet know what the new Apple can really do, and it'll take another two years or so to find out for sure. Until then, we should expect the passionate debate between the faithful and the skeptics to be renewed every time Apple announces anything. Just keep in mind that the debate won't really be about the products. It'll really be about Steve.
Saturday, September 8, 2012
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Thursday, September 6, 2012
Thursday, August 23, 2012
The Seductive Foolishness of a Facebook Phone
The rumors about Facebook making a smartphone have died down -- for the moment. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg said last month that it wouldn't make sense for Facebook to create its own smartphone. I'd like to believe that finally put an end to the rumor forever, but you know it's going to be back. Even when Zuckerberg issued his denial some people claimed he was lying (link).
People react emotionally to hardware. The idea of the leading online community making a phone is sexy, and seems intuitively obvious in an age when software giants like Google and Microsoft are making their own hardware. Of course Facebook is making a phone. Isn't everybody?
It reminds me of elementary school:
Mom: Honey, why did you jump your bike off the roof?
Child: (in traction) Everyone else was doing it.
Mom: If everyone else jumped off a cliff, would you do that too?
Child: Yes, Mom, as a matter of fact I would. Jeez, haven't you heard of peer pressure?
Mark Zuckerberg is young for a CEO, but I hope he's not that young. I think making a smartphone is one of the most spectacularly stupid things Facebook could do. Even if the product succeeded (which is very iffy), the distraction and business problems it would create could do severe damage to the whole company. There are other, much easier ways for Facebook to make itself a power in mobile and to extend its dominance in new areas. I think Zuckerberg and his troops should be concentrating on those enormous opportunities rather than messing around with hardware.
Knowing my luck with predictions, this means Facebook will probably create a phone and make it a huge commercial success. In that case, you're welcome to come back here in a couple of years and tease me. But in the meantime, here's why I think the "Facephone" would be a terrible idea, and what the company should focus on instead.
Making a smartphone: The Red Queen's Race
Most people outside the phone industry don't understand how hard it is to make a competitive smartphone. Mobile hardware is moving at amazing speed, with companies like Samsung packing in new and updated features as quickly as they can. Many customers are very sensitive to these features. If you fall even a little bit behind -- say, with a camera that has too low a resolution, or a slow processor -- many people won't buy your phone, unless you discount it to the point where you aren't making any money.
You might be thinking to yourself, "okay, so just make sure you're using the leading components." That sounds easy, but Samsung in particular specializes in sourcing those new components immediately (or making them itself) and building them into new hardware quickly, all at an aggressive price. Unless you move extremely fast, you'll find yourself releasing new features at the same time as Samsung is moving on to the next generation.
So you need a hardware organization with close ties to the component suppliers, and with enough money to make advance orders for components that haven't shipped yet. And you need to hire several complete engineering teams, so a couple of them can be working on future products in parallel while one team brings the latest flagship to market.
All of this is a huge investment. It's also high risk, because sometimes you'll guess wrong on a component and have to eat its cost. And at best, if you're wildly successful, all you can do is keep pace with Samsung. It won't give you differentiation.
And oh by the way, rising competition from Huawei and ZTE in China is probably going to accelerate the process even further.
Then there's software. A similar situation applies in software, even more so. Apple and Google are competing to see who can cram more new software features into a smartphone. For example, Apple adds voice recognition, and Google immediately counters. If you're not prepared to quickly match all of those features, your phone will end up in the discount bin, the same as if you were behind in hardware.
So to enter the smartphone business today, you need a large software engineering organization creating a huge suite of applications, and updating them frequently. Plus you'll need to do a large amount of hidden software customization to integrate with the specific features and applications of each major mobile operator.
You can save some of this investment by licensing a third-party operating system. The choices are Android and...well, Android. Which is made by your most bitter rival, Google, a company that has shown itself to be willing to manipulate Android to hurt competitors. So maybe you do like Amazon and build on top of an open source version of Android, one that Google doesn't control. But in that case you're using software that's a generation out of date, you have to write many of your own applications, and there's still that software integration work with the operators. You save some time and investment, but not nearly as much as you'd like.
So now you've created a huge hardware and software engineering organization. You next need to pay for all the parts and manufacturing. You must create marketing deals with the operators and tech stores (which means hiring a dedicated salesforce). You need to hire a support staff that responds directly to phone calls and e-mails (something that you, like other Internet companies, don't do). You have to arrange for repairs and returns. You need to license a huge range of patents, so Apple won't sue you. And probably some other details I forgot about.
None of this is impossible for Facebook, but it takes a huge amount of time and investment. It's not the sort of thing that you can do with a skunkworks team of a few dozen engineers from Apple. Google, faced with this same situation, decided to buy Motorola. If you really think Facebook is serious about the smartphone business, then the rumor you need to start is which smartphone company it's going to buy.
I'll kick off the rumors by nominating HTC.
But the real killer problem is that even after you do all of the above, all you've done is make a smartphone that matches the competition. You still need to figure out what makes your phone so compellingly different that people would buy it instead of an iPhone, Samsung Galaxy, or the latest Google Nexus thing.
Differentiation cures all
Reading all of the above, you might respond, "hey, all of the same conditions applied before Apple entered the smartphone business, but it managed to succeed without making many of the investments you talked about." And you'd be right. The iPhone's success shocked the major smartphone players because they assumed the iPhone's relatively poor hardware specs (no 3G!) and missing software features (no MMS!) would make it an afterthought. Apple succeeded because the first iPhone's differentiation -- real PC-style web browsing -- was so compelling that for many users it outweighed all the other drawbacks of the phone. RIM did something similar with mobile e-mail years before, so there is a precedent for shaking up the phone industry with breakthrough devices and relatively low up-front investment. Maybe Facebook can be the next company to redefine the smartphone.
There are two problems with this for Facebook:
1. You're not Apple. Although Apple was not a phone company, it was a world-class consumer hardware manufacturer with a fanatical focus on user experience and quality. RIM had many years of pager experience before it made the first BlackBerry. Neither company made a tweaked phone; they brought a different set of system design practices to the phone industry. The iPhone alone didn't defeat Nokia and Motorola, they were beaten decisively by Apple's business processes. Facebook lacks that sort of process differentiation, especially relative to Google.
2. What possible differentiation in a Facebook phone would be so compelling that it would make the iPhone and Android obsolete? Almost by definition, an innovation that great is something that I can't imagine today. Maybe Mark Zuckerberg can, and if so I salute his vision and welcome our new Facebook overlords.
Which future do you want to live in?
The other issue Facebook needs to consider is what industry structure is best suited to its future.
There's a future scenario in which the usage of the web becomes more and more dominated by smartphones, and in which smartphone users are limited to a selection of apps and websites manipulated by the smartphone manufacturers. In other words, the web becomes a series of walled gardens rather than than the open environment it is today. If you believe that scenario is destined to happen, and if you believe the only way to have a role in smartphones is to make your own hardware, then of course Facebook has to make a smartphone. It's dead otherwise.
But I don't think that's how the future works. It's not a fixed destiny, it's a set of possibilities. Our own actions shape the future and call it into being. The more powerful and persuasive an organization or individual is, the more it can do to shape the future. And Facebook is a very powerful, persuasive company.
I think the best future for Facebook is one in which the web, including the mobile web, stays open to software-only innovation. In this world, customers choose which websites and web apps they want to use, without being forced into a particular choice by a hardware manufacturer. This would enable Facebook to run on all smartphones, keeping the company focused on expanding its network and adding new features and services to it. In other words, Facebook could keep doing what it does best, rather than pouring money into a new set of skills and gambling that it can out-compete Samsung and Apple on their home turf.
If Facebook creates its own smartphone, I think it makes that open future less likely. A Facebook phone would encourage other software companies to make proprietary phones, further closing off software openness. And it would make the other phone companies much less likely to cooperate with Facebook. Today, smartphone companies will fall all over themselves to work with Facebook. Even Apple is actively integrating Facebook with the iPhone. How long will that last once Facebook starts selling a phone? Instead of Facebook everywhere in mobile, we could end up with Facebook noplace except on the Facebook phone.
Beware the Ides of Flash
Right now, Facebook is so popular that Google can't prevent it from working with Android. The more that Apple integrates with Facebook, the more pressure Android licensees will feel to match that integration, even if Google discourages it. But if Facebook were kicked off iPhone, Google would have a much freer hand to disadvantage and exclude Facebook from Android.
This is my biggest concern about the Facebook phone idea. The company could easily produce a phone that is just good enough to scare away its other phone partners, without being good enough to dominate the smartphone market. The Facebook phone could call into being the exact industry structure that Facebook wants to avoid. That's why I see it as hideously high risk, a bet-the-company move that should be taken only when there's no other chance to survive.
And Facebook has other choices.
What Facebook should do
In ecology, the most successful species are not the ones that adapt best to the environment, they're the ones that reshape the environment to match their needs. That's what I think Facebook should be doing. Instead of competing with smartphone manufacturers, it should run a series of integration experiments with them. Facebook's early efforts in that direction were not very successful (link), but that's why I'd put more resources into them -- there's a learning curve.
Facebook's goal should be to get the handset companies competing with each other to build Facebook more and more deeply into the phone. How about creating a set of Facebook integration requirements, and a "Facebook Ready" logo for complying phones?
In addition to integrating the core Facebook functions, Facebook needs to bring along the Facebook economy. The challenge for Facebook is not just to transfer its content to mobile, it's to make available the full ecosystem of third party apps and services that make Facebook so powerful on the desktop. I know some of the smartphone manufacturers don't want anything that looks like a third party platform on their phones, but Facebook is one of the few web companies popular enough to force it. Provide the full ecosystem to some phone manufacturers, and the others will be forced to follow suit.
This would give Facebook not just an application on smartphones, but a mobile platform that it can grow rapidly and in new directions, as it did on the desktop. Instead of competing at the commoditized hardware layer, Facebook can compete at the platform and UI layer where most of the profitability is. It's the right place for Facebook to fight, but it's all put at risk if Facebook makes its own phone.
People react emotionally to hardware. The idea of the leading online community making a phone is sexy, and seems intuitively obvious in an age when software giants like Google and Microsoft are making their own hardware. Of course Facebook is making a phone. Isn't everybody?
It reminds me of elementary school:
Mom: Honey, why did you jump your bike off the roof?
Child: (in traction) Everyone else was doing it.
Mom: If everyone else jumped off a cliff, would you do that too?
Child: Yes, Mom, as a matter of fact I would. Jeez, haven't you heard of peer pressure?
Mark Zuckerberg is young for a CEO, but I hope he's not that young. I think making a smartphone is one of the most spectacularly stupid things Facebook could do. Even if the product succeeded (which is very iffy), the distraction and business problems it would create could do severe damage to the whole company. There are other, much easier ways for Facebook to make itself a power in mobile and to extend its dominance in new areas. I think Zuckerberg and his troops should be concentrating on those enormous opportunities rather than messing around with hardware.
Knowing my luck with predictions, this means Facebook will probably create a phone and make it a huge commercial success. In that case, you're welcome to come back here in a couple of years and tease me. But in the meantime, here's why I think the "Facephone" would be a terrible idea, and what the company should focus on instead.
Making a smartphone: The Red Queen's Race
Most people outside the phone industry don't understand how hard it is to make a competitive smartphone. Mobile hardware is moving at amazing speed, with companies like Samsung packing in new and updated features as quickly as they can. Many customers are very sensitive to these features. If you fall even a little bit behind -- say, with a camera that has too low a resolution, or a slow processor -- many people won't buy your phone, unless you discount it to the point where you aren't making any money.
You might be thinking to yourself, "okay, so just make sure you're using the leading components." That sounds easy, but Samsung in particular specializes in sourcing those new components immediately (or making them itself) and building them into new hardware quickly, all at an aggressive price. Unless you move extremely fast, you'll find yourself releasing new features at the same time as Samsung is moving on to the next generation.
So you need a hardware organization with close ties to the component suppliers, and with enough money to make advance orders for components that haven't shipped yet. And you need to hire several complete engineering teams, so a couple of them can be working on future products in parallel while one team brings the latest flagship to market.
All of this is a huge investment. It's also high risk, because sometimes you'll guess wrong on a component and have to eat its cost. And at best, if you're wildly successful, all you can do is keep pace with Samsung. It won't give you differentiation.
And oh by the way, rising competition from Huawei and ZTE in China is probably going to accelerate the process even further.
Then there's software. A similar situation applies in software, even more so. Apple and Google are competing to see who can cram more new software features into a smartphone. For example, Apple adds voice recognition, and Google immediately counters. If you're not prepared to quickly match all of those features, your phone will end up in the discount bin, the same as if you were behind in hardware.
So to enter the smartphone business today, you need a large software engineering organization creating a huge suite of applications, and updating them frequently. Plus you'll need to do a large amount of hidden software customization to integrate with the specific features and applications of each major mobile operator.
You can save some of this investment by licensing a third-party operating system. The choices are Android and...well, Android. Which is made by your most bitter rival, Google, a company that has shown itself to be willing to manipulate Android to hurt competitors. So maybe you do like Amazon and build on top of an open source version of Android, one that Google doesn't control. But in that case you're using software that's a generation out of date, you have to write many of your own applications, and there's still that software integration work with the operators. You save some time and investment, but not nearly as much as you'd like.
So now you've created a huge hardware and software engineering organization. You next need to pay for all the parts and manufacturing. You must create marketing deals with the operators and tech stores (which means hiring a dedicated salesforce). You need to hire a support staff that responds directly to phone calls and e-mails (something that you, like other Internet companies, don't do). You have to arrange for repairs and returns. You need to license a huge range of patents, so Apple won't sue you. And probably some other details I forgot about.
None of this is impossible for Facebook, but it takes a huge amount of time and investment. It's not the sort of thing that you can do with a skunkworks team of a few dozen engineers from Apple. Google, faced with this same situation, decided to buy Motorola. If you really think Facebook is serious about the smartphone business, then the rumor you need to start is which smartphone company it's going to buy.
I'll kick off the rumors by nominating HTC.
But the real killer problem is that even after you do all of the above, all you've done is make a smartphone that matches the competition. You still need to figure out what makes your phone so compellingly different that people would buy it instead of an iPhone, Samsung Galaxy, or the latest Google Nexus thing.
Differentiation cures all
Reading all of the above, you might respond, "hey, all of the same conditions applied before Apple entered the smartphone business, but it managed to succeed without making many of the investments you talked about." And you'd be right. The iPhone's success shocked the major smartphone players because they assumed the iPhone's relatively poor hardware specs (no 3G!) and missing software features (no MMS!) would make it an afterthought. Apple succeeded because the first iPhone's differentiation -- real PC-style web browsing -- was so compelling that for many users it outweighed all the other drawbacks of the phone. RIM did something similar with mobile e-mail years before, so there is a precedent for shaking up the phone industry with breakthrough devices and relatively low up-front investment. Maybe Facebook can be the next company to redefine the smartphone.
There are two problems with this for Facebook:
1. You're not Apple. Although Apple was not a phone company, it was a world-class consumer hardware manufacturer with a fanatical focus on user experience and quality. RIM had many years of pager experience before it made the first BlackBerry. Neither company made a tweaked phone; they brought a different set of system design practices to the phone industry. The iPhone alone didn't defeat Nokia and Motorola, they were beaten decisively by Apple's business processes. Facebook lacks that sort of process differentiation, especially relative to Google.
2. What possible differentiation in a Facebook phone would be so compelling that it would make the iPhone and Android obsolete? Almost by definition, an innovation that great is something that I can't imagine today. Maybe Mark Zuckerberg can, and if so I salute his vision and welcome our new Facebook overlords.
Which future do you want to live in?
The other issue Facebook needs to consider is what industry structure is best suited to its future.
There's a future scenario in which the usage of the web becomes more and more dominated by smartphones, and in which smartphone users are limited to a selection of apps and websites manipulated by the smartphone manufacturers. In other words, the web becomes a series of walled gardens rather than than the open environment it is today. If you believe that scenario is destined to happen, and if you believe the only way to have a role in smartphones is to make your own hardware, then of course Facebook has to make a smartphone. It's dead otherwise.
But I don't think that's how the future works. It's not a fixed destiny, it's a set of possibilities. Our own actions shape the future and call it into being. The more powerful and persuasive an organization or individual is, the more it can do to shape the future. And Facebook is a very powerful, persuasive company.
I think the best future for Facebook is one in which the web, including the mobile web, stays open to software-only innovation. In this world, customers choose which websites and web apps they want to use, without being forced into a particular choice by a hardware manufacturer. This would enable Facebook to run on all smartphones, keeping the company focused on expanding its network and adding new features and services to it. In other words, Facebook could keep doing what it does best, rather than pouring money into a new set of skills and gambling that it can out-compete Samsung and Apple on their home turf.
If Facebook creates its own smartphone, I think it makes that open future less likely. A Facebook phone would encourage other software companies to make proprietary phones, further closing off software openness. And it would make the other phone companies much less likely to cooperate with Facebook. Today, smartphone companies will fall all over themselves to work with Facebook. Even Apple is actively integrating Facebook with the iPhone. How long will that last once Facebook starts selling a phone? Instead of Facebook everywhere in mobile, we could end up with Facebook noplace except on the Facebook phone.
Beware the Ides of Flash
Right now, Facebook is so popular that Google can't prevent it from working with Android. The more that Apple integrates with Facebook, the more pressure Android licensees will feel to match that integration, even if Google discourages it. But if Facebook were kicked off iPhone, Google would have a much freer hand to disadvantage and exclude Facebook from Android.
This is my biggest concern about the Facebook phone idea. The company could easily produce a phone that is just good enough to scare away its other phone partners, without being good enough to dominate the smartphone market. The Facebook phone could call into being the exact industry structure that Facebook wants to avoid. That's why I see it as hideously high risk, a bet-the-company move that should be taken only when there's no other chance to survive.
And Facebook has other choices.
What Facebook should do
In ecology, the most successful species are not the ones that adapt best to the environment, they're the ones that reshape the environment to match their needs. That's what I think Facebook should be doing. Instead of competing with smartphone manufacturers, it should run a series of integration experiments with them. Facebook's early efforts in that direction were not very successful (link), but that's why I'd put more resources into them -- there's a learning curve.
Facebook's goal should be to get the handset companies competing with each other to build Facebook more and more deeply into the phone. How about creating a set of Facebook integration requirements, and a "Facebook Ready" logo for complying phones?
In addition to integrating the core Facebook functions, Facebook needs to bring along the Facebook economy. The challenge for Facebook is not just to transfer its content to mobile, it's to make available the full ecosystem of third party apps and services that make Facebook so powerful on the desktop. I know some of the smartphone manufacturers don't want anything that looks like a third party platform on their phones, but Facebook is one of the few web companies popular enough to force it. Provide the full ecosystem to some phone manufacturers, and the others will be forced to follow suit.
This would give Facebook not just an application on smartphones, but a mobile platform that it can grow rapidly and in new directions, as it did on the desktop. Instead of competing at the commoditized hardware layer, Facebook can compete at the platform and UI layer where most of the profitability is. It's the right place for Facebook to fight, but it's all put at risk if Facebook makes its own phone.
Tuesday, August 14, 2012
FIRMWARE NOKIA C2-05 RM-724 BI ONLY
FIRMWARE NOKIA C2-05 RM-724 BI ONLY
DOWNLOAD DISINI
http://nds2.fds-fire.nokia.com/p/d/fds_fire/1206/1718/7064514864/58F0C452_RM724_059J898_08.73_035.dcp
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Thursday, August 9, 2012
FIRMWARE NOKIA X1-00 RM-733
FIRMWARE NOKIA X1-00 RM-733
VARIAN : LATIN D GREY
DOWNLOAD DISINI
RM733_059D949_05.95_001.dcp
1506B253_rm7330_nai05.95bb
F55DAA9A_rm733_005.950
42B0921D_rm733_005.95bb
SimLockDataVerifier_vDCT4.sim
RM733_059D949_05.95_001.spr
EF9F1DA8_040-099213v2.pcx
040-099213v2_label_layout.xml
RM733_059D949_05.95_001_signature.bin
VARIAN : LATIN D GREY
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RM733_059D949_05.95_001.dcp
1506B253_rm7330_nai05.95bb
F55DAA9A_rm733_005.950
42B0921D_rm733_005.95bb
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EF9F1DA8_040-099213v2.pcx
040-099213v2_label_layout.xml
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FIRMWARE NOKIA X1-01 RM-713 BI ONLY
FIRMWARE NOKIA X1-01 RM-713 BI ONLY
DOWNLOAD DISINI
RM713_059D8Q4_07.50_001.dcp
rm713_007.500
rm7130_nai07.50me_nlt
rm713_007.50me
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rm7130_nai07.50me_nlt
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F0A618F8_P10606501dpi600.pcx
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Wednesday, August 8, 2012
FIRMWARE NOKIA X3-02 Rm-639 VERSI 7.16 bi only
FIRMWARE NOKIA X3-02 Rm-639 VERSI 7.16 bi only
Download disini
rm639__07.16.mcusw
rm639__07.16.ppm_x
RM639_label_english_MoMe_003_reprint_flag.xml
85CC532C_P08744004dpi600.pcx
RM639_0598221_07.16_012.dcp
rm639__07.16.image_x_0598221_009
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rm639__07.16.mcusw
rm639__07.16.ppm_x
RM639_label_english_MoMe_003_reprint_flag.xml
85CC532C_P08744004dpi600.pcx
RM639_0598221_07.16_012.dcp
rm639__07.16.image_x_0598221_009
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How To Update Samsung S5830i Galaxy Ace Firmware by Odin Flasher
How To Update Samsung S5830i Galaxy Ace Firmware by Odin Flasher
tutorial
Download disini
tutorial.doc
tutorial
Download disini
tutorial.doc
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
FIRMWARE NOKIA C5-05 Rm-185
FIRMWARE NOKIA C5-05 Rm-185
download disini
RM-815_22.5.007_prd.core.C00
RM-815_22.5.007_prd.rofs2.V21
RM-815_22.5.007_C01_prd.rofs3.fpsx
RM815_816_003_U002.uda.fpsx
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RM-815_22.5.007_prd.core.C00
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RM815_816_003_U002.uda.fpsx
RM815_059K886_22.5.007_001.dcp
RM815_059K886_22.5.007_001_signature.bin
RM815_059K886_22.5.007_001.vpl
Monday, August 6, 2012
FIRMWARE SAMSUNG GALAXY MINI S5570
FIRMWARE SAMSUNG GALAXY MINI S5570
DOWNLOAD DISINI
S5570_S5670_S5830_Odin_Multi_D.html
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S5570_S5670_S5830_Odin_Multi_D.html
FIRMWARE SAMSUNG GALAXY ACE (S5570_S5670_S5830)
FIRMWARE SAMSUNG GALAXY ACE
DOWNLOAD DISINI
S5570_S5670_S5830_Odin_Multi_D.html
FIRMWARE SAMSUNG C3303k CHAMP
FIRMWARE SAMSUNG C3303k CHAMP
download disini
C3303i_Flash_loader_747_SSG_v0.html
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C3303i_Flash_loader_747_SSG_v0.html
FIRMWARE NOKIA x2-02 RH-694 versi 11.63 BIONLY
versi 11.63
download disini
DCAD72A2_RM694_059H3B2_11.63_032.vpl
7E1A606B_RM694_059H3B2_11.63_032.dcp
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FIRMWARE NOKIA 1202 RH-112
DOWNLOAD DISINI
rh111_03.040
RH111_0568584_3.04_001.dcp
rh111_03.04mu
rh1110_nai3.04mu
RH111_0568584_3.04_001_signature.bin
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
NOKIA CABLE FINDER versi 9
NOKIA CABLE FINDER VERSI 9
untuk memudahkan pencarian kabel Flashing , persamaan kabel untuk ponsel Nokia.
Silahkan download:
Miror creator :
Nokia_Cable_Finder_Version-9__by_Mehmood_Riaz.rar
untuk memudahkan pencarian kabel Flashing , persamaan kabel untuk ponsel Nokia.
Silahkan download:
Miror creator :
Nokia_Cable_Finder_Version-9__by_Mehmood_Riaz.rar
Sunday, July 29, 2012
FIRMWARE Samsung S5360 galaxy y
FIRMWARE Samsung S5360 galaxy y
download disini
FIRMWARE S5360 GALAXY Y
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FIRMWARE S5360 GALAXY Y
Tuesday, July 17, 2012
FIRMWARE Samsung S6102 Galaxy Y Duos
Samsung S6102 Galaxy Y Duos Firmwares
DOWNLOAD DISINI
S6102DXLF2 / OLBLD1 XSE Indonesia
S6102DXLC2 / OLB XSE Indonesia
DOWNLOAD DISINI
S6102DXLF2 / OLBLD1 XSE Indonesia
S6102DXLC2 / OLB XSE Indonesia
FIRMWARE NOKIA 101 RM-769 BIONLY
FIRMWARE NOKIA 101 RM-769 BIONLY
DOWNLOAD DISINI
A4782967_RM769_059H0D0_06.25_001.vpl
78B1F74E_RM769_059H0D0_06.25_001.dcp
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Monday, July 16, 2012
Quick Takes: RIM's Marketing, Microsoft Takes Even More Risks, and A Lesson from Digg
Short thoughts on recent tech news...
How not to turn around a company, part 1
Some day, my friend, you might become the CEO of a major technology company. (Heck, maybe you're one right now.) When you are a CEO, you sometimes have to deliver bad news to the public. Maybe it'll be a poor quarter, or a product that doesn't work as advertised. Or maybe you'll be in charge of a major corporate turnaround, in which case you'll have to deliver a lot of bad news.
There are some very specific rules for how you deliver that news. You can't sound like you're in denial, but at the same time you can't surrender to the gloom that will flow like a river from the press and analysts you talk to. It's their job to make the case for what's wrong; it's your job to make the case for how you will fix it.
One of the rules of this process is that you can't adopt the language of the people criticizing your company. If you do, they'll play back that language at you.
For example, say someone asks "did your company deliberately steal millions of dollars from your customers?" There are several good ways to respond. You can go for incredulity: "Anyone who says that is completely out of touch with reality." You can accuse the reporter of naivete: "You've been spending too much time on the bulletin boards. I talk with our customers every day, and they are very happy with their relationship with us." Or you can just change the subject: "Let me explain what we're doing."
What you must not do is repeat the hostile wording in the question ("no, we did not steal millions of dollars"). That's a trap, because you legitimize the accusation by repeating it. The headline the next day will be "CEO denies stealing millions of dollars," something so inflammatory that a reporter on his or her own could never get it into a headline.
RIM CEO Thorsten Heins fell into this trap in an interview he did with CBC in early July. It's a good interview; I encourage you to listen to it here.
The interviewer, Matt Galloway, is politely professional but relentless. The interview reminds me of what can happen sometimes with British journalists when they see themselves as proxies for the audience, exposing the misdeeds of the rich and powerful.
Galloway uses death imagery throughout the interview: "seems to be if not at death's door, it's in the vicinity"..."another nail in the coffin"..."the company may not be around by the time this thing comes out." So it's a tough interview.
Heins handles most of it fairly well. He sounds beleaguered at times, and he allows the interviewer to drive the subjects, instead of taking over the flow of the interview. But he generally sticks to his message. Until the last question. Galloway asks:
This is actually the only creampuff question in the interview. Heins is being invited to talk about the new RIM handsets coming out now, and what's to come next year. Or he could brag about sales in markets where RIM is doing well. Journalists, especially on TV and radio, will often give you an easy question at the end so the segment will have an upbeat ending (and so they won't look like total attack dogs). Unfortunately, Heins chooses this moment to go defensive and start playing back the interviewer's language:
"This company is not ignoring the world out there, nor is it in a death spiral."
So the interview ends on a sour note, and guess what the headlines say the next day:
The only words all of the headlines share are "RIM" and "death spiral." What do you think people are going to remember?
The problem with doing a turnaround like RIM's is not that the task is impossible, but that it requires incredibly good execution. You have to get a long list of things just right. That's hard in any firm, but in a company that's laying off people and shuffling its management, it becomes even more difficult. So far I don't see the necessary attention to detail from RIM.
How not to turn around a company, part 2
As long as we're picking on RIM, one of the other principles of a turnaround is to underpromise and overdeliver. Make the situation seem as bleak as possible at the start, so you can surprise people with good news later. If you think a product will be done in June of this year, promise it by December. If you expect that the next couple of quarters may be bad, declare that the entire year will be a disaster. Especially when you're a new CEO, no one's going to fire you for being gloomy in your first couple of weeks, and you will buy time for the turnaround to start working.
And don't worry about the stock price. Trash it now so you'll look like a hero when it rises later (and so there will be no basis for a shareholder lawsuit).
Thorsten Heins did the exact opposite when he took over RIM. He reinforced his predecessors' promise that the BlackBerry 10 OS would be out this year, and he made some very upbeat statements when he took over the job. Galloway even played back a recording of one of them in the CBC interview. Heins said in January: "I don't think that times are that difficult...it's an exciting time to take over. RIM is not a turnaround company. RIM is a financially healthy and sound company."
Six months later, the OS schedule has slipped, and obviously RIM is in a turnaround. Instead of looking like the solution, Heins comes across like he's part of the problem.
The consistent theme here is self-inflicted wounds caused by bad marketing and PR.
Surface: Another Microsoft gamble
I continue to be fascinated by the moves Microsoft is making around Windows 8. The OS has a radically new UI, and violates some of the most basic rules on how to do a platform transition. I don't know whether to admire Microsoft's courage, or to be appalled at the unnecessary risks the company is taking.
I got the same feeling when I saw the previews of Microsoft's new tablet/PC devices, called Surface. The pictures of them look swoopy, and I really like the idea of the flexible keyboard/cover that lets you use the tablet (sort of) like a notebook computer. I'm also extremely intrigued by the model with a stylus (could this, at last, be the foundation for an info pad?) Surface is giving me a serious case of technolust.
Unfortunately, we don't yet know many of the most important facts about Surface, such as what it'll cost, where it will be sold, and what it's like in long-term use. If the answers are bad, Surface could become a curiosity on the order of the Palm Foleo (or maybe Microsoft's own Zune). On the other hand, if everything is right, Surface could be a milestone product that helps reshape personal computing.
The one thing that's certain is that Surface is a high-risk business move for Microsoft. For its entire history, Microsoft has avoided competing directly with its hardware licensees. It certainly manipulated and sometimes exploited them, but it did not sell PCs against them. Surface breaks that taboo. It has to be putting a chill through Microsoft's licensees. You want to share your hardware road map with your OS company, to make sure your products are coordinated with the OS. But who's ever going to share their hardware plans with Microsoft when you know those ideas could sneak into a Microsoft device? The licensees won't dump Windows, but they could easily reduce their investment in it. And they might be scared away from the market for Windows tablets, the place where Microsoft is most anxious to grow.
Depending on Microsoft's manufacturing and sales plans, there's a danger that Surface could be just successful enough to damage the market for Windows 8 products without having enough impact to change the competitive situation versus iPad, Android, and Mac. We don't know how many Surface devices Microsoft is making, or how they will be distributed. The hints I've seen so far are that Surface will be available in Microsoft stores and online, but no place else. If Surface is a hit, what happens to the rest of the PC retail channel? Do Best Buy and its peers around the world just step aside? And will they invest in promoting Windows 8 computers if the most popular Windows 8 device is not available to them?
Has Microsoft ordered enough Surface devices to fill the demand if it's popular? If Microsoft has ordered a lot, maybe it'll have extra units for the Best Buys of the world. But the more Microsoft invests in inventory, the greater the financial risk if Surface doesn't sell well. Microsoft could be stuck with a huge inventory writedown, or might be forced to sell Surface at a very low price, spoiling the market for other Windows licensees.
I guess (and it's just a guess) that Microsoft will put the price of Surface a bit on the high side, with a fairly low sales forecast. That would reduce the impact on licensees, and make it easier to manage inventory. In that case, Surface becomes something like a concept car, not affordable to the average customer but encouraging licensees to do something similar (see here and here).
Ashlee Vance at BusinessWeek pointed out that it's Microsoft's own fault that it needs a concept car (link):
The rumor mill says the low-end Surface device will be in the $600 range, and the high-end one around $800 (link). That's concept car territory, in my opinion.
But even the concept car approach has risks. If Surface doesn't sell well, will the licensees bother to copy it? They usually want to copy best-sellers. On the other hand, if Surface is viewed as a lustworthy product, will PC buyers delay purchases of other Windows 8 devices to wait for Surface clones?
The usual rule is never to give hardware customers a reason to wait, and Surface could do just that.
If I were a PC licensee, I'd be thinking very seriously about investing more in Android tablets. Except that Google, to compete with its rogue licensee Amazon, just announced its own Google-branded tablet at $200. That pricing isn't a concept car; it's more like a knife to the heart of other Android tablet makers.
Maybe that's why Microsoft feels it can get away with doing Surface; the licensees really have no place else to go.
So I end up back where I started, admiring Microsoft's courage but wondering about its strategy. From a tech industry standpoint, it's nice to see a big company like Microsoft stirring the pot. We need more of that. And I admire Microsoft's willingness to change radically rather than waiting for something bad to happen to it, a la RIM. But Microsoft is taking a huge number of risks all at once, and some of its plans feel like they were not deeply thought through. If Microsoft screws up, it could severely wound itself in short order.
It all reminds me of something an Apple exec once told me. He was a former Sun manager, and liked to quote the often profane strategy pronouncements of Sun executives. One of his favorites (and forgive me if I offend) was "no brass balls, no blue chips." In other words, if you don't have the courage to take big risks, you won't win the big payoffs.
I get the feeling that Microsoft these days is operating on the same principle. It sounds like great advice, until you think where Sun ended up.
Humility
There's been a lot written online about the fate of Digg, one of the original "Web 2.0" poster children. I don't have much to add regarding its current situation, but I think back to a conference I attended in 2006 called "The Future of Web Apps." It included many of the most prominent Web 2.0 CEOs, including Kevin Rose of Digg. Michael Arrington spoke there as well.
Rose talked about evolving Digg into a social network in which people would be connected by shared interests rather than whether they have hot photos (this was back when Facebook was just a college socialization site). Rose's idea for Digg sounds interesting; you wonder what happened to it.
Rose also said Digg was on the road to profitability based on advertising and traffic growth. Oh well.
But the most interesting tidbit I remember from the conference was Michael Arrington saying that Web 2.0 companies don't need a perfect revenue model. The general attitude of everyone at the conference (not just Arrington, and I am not trying to single him out) was that if you attract an audience, you will find some way to monetize it.
In the tech industry, one of the most common mistakes is to look at a trend today and assume that it'll continue in the future. The reality is that basic economics usually reasserts itself at some point. For businesses, that means you need to provide real value to real customers, with a realistic way to monetize it. And you need to figure that out pretty early in the process, or you're taking a huge risk that you'll never get the answer.
It's something to keep in mind for the hundreds of thousands of companies creating mobile apps today because it's the hot thing to do.
How not to turn around a company, part 1
Some day, my friend, you might become the CEO of a major technology company. (Heck, maybe you're one right now.) When you are a CEO, you sometimes have to deliver bad news to the public. Maybe it'll be a poor quarter, or a product that doesn't work as advertised. Or maybe you'll be in charge of a major corporate turnaround, in which case you'll have to deliver a lot of bad news.
There are some very specific rules for how you deliver that news. You can't sound like you're in denial, but at the same time you can't surrender to the gloom that will flow like a river from the press and analysts you talk to. It's their job to make the case for what's wrong; it's your job to make the case for how you will fix it.
One of the rules of this process is that you can't adopt the language of the people criticizing your company. If you do, they'll play back that language at you.
For example, say someone asks "did your company deliberately steal millions of dollars from your customers?" There are several good ways to respond. You can go for incredulity: "Anyone who says that is completely out of touch with reality." You can accuse the reporter of naivete: "You've been spending too much time on the bulletin boards. I talk with our customers every day, and they are very happy with their relationship with us." Or you can just change the subject: "Let me explain what we're doing."
What you must not do is repeat the hostile wording in the question ("no, we did not steal millions of dollars"). That's a trap, because you legitimize the accusation by repeating it. The headline the next day will be "CEO denies stealing millions of dollars," something so inflammatory that a reporter on his or her own could never get it into a headline.
RIM CEO Thorsten Heins fell into this trap in an interview he did with CBC in early July. It's a good interview; I encourage you to listen to it here.
The interviewer, Matt Galloway, is politely professional but relentless. The interview reminds me of what can happen sometimes with British journalists when they see themselves as proxies for the audience, exposing the misdeeds of the rich and powerful.
Galloway uses death imagery throughout the interview: "seems to be if not at death's door, it's in the vicinity"..."another nail in the coffin"..."the company may not be around by the time this thing comes out." So it's a tough interview.
Heins handles most of it fairly well. He sounds beleaguered at times, and he allows the interviewer to drive the subjects, instead of taking over the flow of the interview. But he generally sticks to his message. Until the last question. Galloway asks:
"The public perception now is that it's a company in a death spiral, on death's door, and about to become irrelevant. How do you turn that public perception around and make people believe that you can create devices that people will want?"
This is actually the only creampuff question in the interview. Heins is being invited to talk about the new RIM handsets coming out now, and what's to come next year. Or he could brag about sales in markets where RIM is doing well. Journalists, especially on TV and radio, will often give you an easy question at the end so the segment will have an upbeat ending (and so they won't look like total attack dogs). Unfortunately, Heins chooses this moment to go defensive and start playing back the interviewer's language:
"This company is not ignoring the world out there, nor is it in a death spiral."
So the interview ends on a sour note, and guess what the headlines say the next day:
The only words all of the headlines share are "RIM" and "death spiral." What do you think people are going to remember?
The problem with doing a turnaround like RIM's is not that the task is impossible, but that it requires incredibly good execution. You have to get a long list of things just right. That's hard in any firm, but in a company that's laying off people and shuffling its management, it becomes even more difficult. So far I don't see the necessary attention to detail from RIM.
How not to turn around a company, part 2
As long as we're picking on RIM, one of the other principles of a turnaround is to underpromise and overdeliver. Make the situation seem as bleak as possible at the start, so you can surprise people with good news later. If you think a product will be done in June of this year, promise it by December. If you expect that the next couple of quarters may be bad, declare that the entire year will be a disaster. Especially when you're a new CEO, no one's going to fire you for being gloomy in your first couple of weeks, and you will buy time for the turnaround to start working.
And don't worry about the stock price. Trash it now so you'll look like a hero when it rises later (and so there will be no basis for a shareholder lawsuit).
Thorsten Heins did the exact opposite when he took over RIM. He reinforced his predecessors' promise that the BlackBerry 10 OS would be out this year, and he made some very upbeat statements when he took over the job. Galloway even played back a recording of one of them in the CBC interview. Heins said in January: "I don't think that times are that difficult...it's an exciting time to take over. RIM is not a turnaround company. RIM is a financially healthy and sound company."
Six months later, the OS schedule has slipped, and obviously RIM is in a turnaround. Instead of looking like the solution, Heins comes across like he's part of the problem.
The consistent theme here is self-inflicted wounds caused by bad marketing and PR.
Surface: Another Microsoft gamble
I continue to be fascinated by the moves Microsoft is making around Windows 8. The OS has a radically new UI, and violates some of the most basic rules on how to do a platform transition. I don't know whether to admire Microsoft's courage, or to be appalled at the unnecessary risks the company is taking.
I got the same feeling when I saw the previews of Microsoft's new tablet/PC devices, called Surface. The pictures of them look swoopy, and I really like the idea of the flexible keyboard/cover that lets you use the tablet (sort of) like a notebook computer. I'm also extremely intrigued by the model with a stylus (could this, at last, be the foundation for an info pad?) Surface is giving me a serious case of technolust.
Unfortunately, we don't yet know many of the most important facts about Surface, such as what it'll cost, where it will be sold, and what it's like in long-term use. If the answers are bad, Surface could become a curiosity on the order of the Palm Foleo (or maybe Microsoft's own Zune). On the other hand, if everything is right, Surface could be a milestone product that helps reshape personal computing.
The one thing that's certain is that Surface is a high-risk business move for Microsoft. For its entire history, Microsoft has avoided competing directly with its hardware licensees. It certainly manipulated and sometimes exploited them, but it did not sell PCs against them. Surface breaks that taboo. It has to be putting a chill through Microsoft's licensees. You want to share your hardware road map with your OS company, to make sure your products are coordinated with the OS. But who's ever going to share their hardware plans with Microsoft when you know those ideas could sneak into a Microsoft device? The licensees won't dump Windows, but they could easily reduce their investment in it. And they might be scared away from the market for Windows tablets, the place where Microsoft is most anxious to grow.
Depending on Microsoft's manufacturing and sales plans, there's a danger that Surface could be just successful enough to damage the market for Windows 8 products without having enough impact to change the competitive situation versus iPad, Android, and Mac. We don't know how many Surface devices Microsoft is making, or how they will be distributed. The hints I've seen so far are that Surface will be available in Microsoft stores and online, but no place else. If Surface is a hit, what happens to the rest of the PC retail channel? Do Best Buy and its peers around the world just step aside? And will they invest in promoting Windows 8 computers if the most popular Windows 8 device is not available to them?
Has Microsoft ordered enough Surface devices to fill the demand if it's popular? If Microsoft has ordered a lot, maybe it'll have extra units for the Best Buys of the world. But the more Microsoft invests in inventory, the greater the financial risk if Surface doesn't sell well. Microsoft could be stuck with a huge inventory writedown, or might be forced to sell Surface at a very low price, spoiling the market for other Windows licensees.
I guess (and it's just a guess) that Microsoft will put the price of Surface a bit on the high side, with a fairly low sales forecast. That would reduce the impact on licensees, and make it easier to manage inventory. In that case, Surface becomes something like a concept car, not affordable to the average customer but encouraging licensees to do something similar (see here and here).
Ashlee Vance at BusinessWeek pointed out that it's Microsoft's own fault that it needs a concept car (link):
"Microsoft, in many ways, helped create this mess... Along with Intel, it sucked all the profits out of the PC industry, leaving HP and Dell to rely on manufacturing companies in Taiwan for their innovative twists. The result has been the Great Stagnation."
The rumor mill says the low-end Surface device will be in the $600 range, and the high-end one around $800 (link). That's concept car territory, in my opinion.
But even the concept car approach has risks. If Surface doesn't sell well, will the licensees bother to copy it? They usually want to copy best-sellers. On the other hand, if Surface is viewed as a lustworthy product, will PC buyers delay purchases of other Windows 8 devices to wait for Surface clones?
The usual rule is never to give hardware customers a reason to wait, and Surface could do just that.
If I were a PC licensee, I'd be thinking very seriously about investing more in Android tablets. Except that Google, to compete with its rogue licensee Amazon, just announced its own Google-branded tablet at $200. That pricing isn't a concept car; it's more like a knife to the heart of other Android tablet makers.
Maybe that's why Microsoft feels it can get away with doing Surface; the licensees really have no place else to go.
So I end up back where I started, admiring Microsoft's courage but wondering about its strategy. From a tech industry standpoint, it's nice to see a big company like Microsoft stirring the pot. We need more of that. And I admire Microsoft's willingness to change radically rather than waiting for something bad to happen to it, a la RIM. But Microsoft is taking a huge number of risks all at once, and some of its plans feel like they were not deeply thought through. If Microsoft screws up, it could severely wound itself in short order.
It all reminds me of something an Apple exec once told me. He was a former Sun manager, and liked to quote the often profane strategy pronouncements of Sun executives. One of his favorites (and forgive me if I offend) was "no brass balls, no blue chips." In other words, if you don't have the courage to take big risks, you won't win the big payoffs.
I get the feeling that Microsoft these days is operating on the same principle. It sounds like great advice, until you think where Sun ended up.
Humility
There's been a lot written online about the fate of Digg, one of the original "Web 2.0" poster children. I don't have much to add regarding its current situation, but I think back to a conference I attended in 2006 called "The Future of Web Apps." It included many of the most prominent Web 2.0 CEOs, including Kevin Rose of Digg. Michael Arrington spoke there as well.
Rose talked about evolving Digg into a social network in which people would be connected by shared interests rather than whether they have hot photos (this was back when Facebook was just a college socialization site). Rose's idea for Digg sounds interesting; you wonder what happened to it.
Rose also said Digg was on the road to profitability based on advertising and traffic growth. Oh well.
But the most interesting tidbit I remember from the conference was Michael Arrington saying that Web 2.0 companies don't need a perfect revenue model. The general attitude of everyone at the conference (not just Arrington, and I am not trying to single him out) was that if you attract an audience, you will find some way to monetize it.
In the tech industry, one of the most common mistakes is to look at a trend today and assume that it'll continue in the future. The reality is that basic economics usually reasserts itself at some point. For businesses, that means you need to provide real value to real customers, with a realistic way to monetize it. And you need to figure that out pretty early in the process, or you're taking a huge risk that you'll never get the answer.
It's something to keep in mind for the hundreds of thousands of companies creating mobile apps today because it's the hot thing to do.
Sunday, June 24, 2012
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
The Coming Age of the Context Engine
People talk a lot about information overload, but I think the worst problem we have in information management today is memory overload -- the inability of the human brain to retain all the important information we run into in our careers. There's more stuff we need to remember than you can possibly hold in your head. The more successful you are, the more information you need to remember -- and the worse the problem becomes.
I think what we need is a context engine, an app that helps you recall the context around any bit of information in your life. Unlike a search engine, a context engine indexes just the information in your life, and supplements your own memory. "How do I know this person?" "What's the agenda for my next meeting?" "Who sent me that article last year, and where the heck is the article?" A context engine will help you answer these questions quickly, anytime and anywhere you need the information.
The product that I'm working on, Zekira, is a first generation context engine. In this post I'll discuss the need for a context engine, how it would work, and our status with Zekira. I'll also give some information on how you can help, if you're interested.
The trouble with information overload
Information overload is a hot topic with a long history. The term was coined in the 1960s, and popularized in 1970 by Alvin Toffler's book Future Shock, according to an excellent article in Wikipedia (link). But the idea goes back further. Xerox implies that it invented information sharing through the development of the photocopier in the mid-1900s (link), And there have apparently been complaints about too much information for as long as we've had writing. The Bible complains about the proliferation of books, the Romans worried about it, and so did the ancient Chinese. Once Gutenberg got going with movable type, the complaints increased (link).
Information overload is a popular subject online. The Wall Street Journal said Google returned 2.92 million hits for it in 2009; the same search today returns 3.76 million, an increase of about 770 references per day.
Prominent authorities opinig on the hazards of information overload include the New York Times (link), Wired (link), and none other than the big consultancy McKinsey, which says it is "killing productivity...and making us unhappy" (link).
The critics of information overload complain that it bombards people with so much data that they are stunned into stupidity. They become low-grade data zombies, incapable of making intelligent decisions.
The answer, we're told, is to take in less information. The experts tell us to delete e-mails and limit our exposure to information online so that we can reserve time for thinking deep thoughts and forming long-term memories.
Okay. It makes sense that we should set aside time to think. But I believe distraction isn't a function of how much information you bring in, it's a function of how much self-discipline you lack. There's always something you can distract yourself with; if it's not e-mail it'll be Angry Birds. You could have the same problem if you had five e-mails a day or five hundred.
I think blaming "information overload" for the problem of distracted people is like blaming "water overload" for the problem of drowning. The fact is, modern society runs on the flow of information. The more information you can handle, the more productive you'll be, and the further you'll go in your career. Given the way the economy works, telling people to limit their information flow is a little like telling them to make themselves stupid. Instead, I think, we should be increasing our ability to manage that information, so we can be more productive.
The real problem is memory overload
Once you step back from demonizing information itself, it's easier to identify the problems that we have in dealing with so much information. I think the biggest problem in information management today is the limitation of human memory.
Think about how you remember things. It's usually through associations -- I saw it in the newspaper when I was at that cafe, I read it in that article on The Register while I was riding the bus, etc. When people have more information to remember than their brains can hold onto, those chains of association start to break down. You remember the fact that you once knew something, but can't recall the information itself.
As I talk with busy knowledge workers -- the type of people who manage the most information -- I hear stories about half-remembered information all the time. You'll see a person and know that you've met them, but can't recall the details about how you know them or what you discussed with them. Or a topic will come up and you'll remember that you read something important about it, but you won't recall where you saw it or how you could find that information again.
Often you know the information is stored somewhere on a computer or smartphone or website, but you have no way to look for it in the moment you need it. Even if you remember to look up the information later, it's usually extremely hard to find, and you can't take the time to do it.
The more successful you become in your career, the more information you have, and the more overloaded your memory gets. Of course it eventually overflows. The problem is so ubiquitous that most of us don't even think of it as a problem; it's just a feature of life. We shrug it off as a "senior moment" and uneasily move on.
But it has nothing to do with age; it's a function of experience. Take all the information held by a mid-career professional and stuff it into a 20-year-old's head and he or she will have the same problems.
When you add up all those "senior moments" across all the people they happen to, they constitute a huge loss in productivity among the busiest and most pivotal people in the economy. The only reason we tolerate this situation is because we assume there's nothing we can do about it.
But I think we can. The combination of mobile technology, low-cost computer storage, and web services makes it possible to build what I call a context engine -- an app designed specifically to help you recall the information in your life, and all the context around it.
You'll use a context engine to quickly recall:
-All the details of your relationship with someone -- how you met them, messages and documents you've exchanged, and meetings you've been in together.
-The backstory to a meeting, including the messages that led up to it, attendees, notes and pictures you took during the meeting, and followup messages afterward.
-A tweet or Facebook post or e-mail you saw months ago mentioning a great new restaurant that you want to try.
-That report sent to you five years ago by some guy you met at a half-remembered conference in Boston.
How the context engine will work
A context engine needs to do three things with your information: Collect, connect, and communicate.
1. Collect. To build a map of all your information, the context engine needs to gather it from all the places where your information is stored. That means, first, scanning the hard drives and other storage devices connected to your personal computer. E-mails, contacts, and meeting records all need to be extracted from whatever messaging and calendar system you use. For most mid-career professionals, that means digging into old Microsoft Outlook archives, called PST files. Other documents -- especially presentations and word processing files -- need to be sucked in as well, along with the most ubiquitous file format in business and academics, the PDF.
But you can't stop with the PC. The context engine needs to reach out to your web apps, to extract things like gMail messages, tweets, and Facebook posts and contacts. And the information on your smartphone needs to be included, everything from contacts to text messages to pictures.
This process should be automatic and comprehensive. Everything should be indexed. You shouldn't be asked to choose which files you want to remember, because you can't know in advance what you'll need.
2. Connect. Once all that information has been collected, it must be organized. That means indexing it not just by keywords, the way we would for a traditional web search, but by all of its attributes, including date, time, location, type of content, and so on.
This is a key difference between a web search engine and a context engine. In web searches, we look almost exclusively for keywords, and we use the wisdom of crowds to determine which matches are most important. That works great for searches of publicly-available content, but it breaks down when searching your personal archive. You may not remember the right keyword for a document or message, and the wisdom of crowds is much less useful for ranking results, because everyone's context is unique. Instead, a context engine needs to offer many search paths through the archive, so people can search using whatever bits of information they do remember about a topic.
The context engine should also present information to you in a way that lets you jump between bits of related data. Say you're looking for the record of a lunch meeting. You might be looking for it because you want to find the name of the person you met with, or some messages you exchanged with that person. Or maybe you just want the name of the restaurant so you can eat there again. All of that information needs to be cued up so you can jump to it easily. Again, the goal is to help you re-create those half-remembered chains of association.
Many of the products that in the past have tried to organize personal information (such as Google Desktop) have mimicked the keyword-centric searching we do on the web. Web search is so ubiquitous that we're all a bit like the man with the proverbial hammer -- every problem looks like a nail. But I think personal context requires a radically different structure to the database and UI. It's not about searching for things, it's about navigating through your context.
3. Communicate. You don't know when you'll need to remember something, so the context engine needs to be available on your mobile devices. In particular, I think a context engine is a killer app for tablets in business. Imagine always having your entire information history at your fingertips in every meeting and every conversation. How much more productive could you be if you had a perfect memory all day long?
I can't tell you how many people in Silicon Valley have told me sheepishly that they don't know what to do with their iPads at work. They generally love them at home, where they access entertainment and informational content. But at the office, particularly in meetings, they tend to turn into tools for covertly checking messages and browsing when the meeting gets slow. Please don't misunderstand, I know there are many things you can do with an iPad. But I'm reporting what I hear from a lot of iPad users.
Far be it from me to judge the way others fill their time, but I think the context engine would give you a good business reason to carry your tablet all day.
That means the database needs to be hosted in the cloud, which creates all sorts of important security challenges. Having your extended memory hacked is utterly unacceptable.
Building the context engine
As you know if you've been following my earlier updates, the startup that I'm working on, Zekira, is building a context engine. The company consists of four engineers plus myself, and we've been working on it for more than a year. Zekira is the fulfillment of a dream for us. One of us, Rudi Diezmann, has been working on personal search products since the 1980s. Others of us first thought about this problem when we were working at Palm almost ten years ago. We were looking at user problems a PDA or smartphone could solve, beyond helping you manage your calendar and contacts. There was a group of customers who responded very strongly to any product that could help them recall information and the context around it.
But only recently have mobile computers and wireless networks become powerful enough to let you build a full-function context engine.
The first version of Zekira is in early beta. It runs on Macs and PCs, and right now it indexes information found on your computer and any storage attached to it. Our goal is to take Zekira mobile, and to add web data sources, as soon as possible. But we did the first version on personal computers so we could get started testing the database and search capability. Besides, there are a lot of people with old Outlook and Office archives who would be happy to turn a context engine loose on them.
Zekira gives you a little search window that you can leave up on the screen, or minimize:
After you do a search, your results appear in this window:
The four stacks in the center show you all the items that matched your current search. In this case, we're seeing things related to Tom Shannon, including documents that he wrote or that mention his name, messages you've exchanged with him, and his contact record. Click on any of those items and you'll see information related to them.
The tabs on the left are filters that let you narrow the search. Currently they let you search by time/date (the filter shown), name, word, document type, and folder:
You can combine multiple filters to do complex layered searches. The filters are extensible, and we plan to add additional search tools in the future.
We're doing a crowdfunding campaign for Zekira on the funding website Indiegogo. If you don't know how crowdfunding works, people can make small financial contributions to a project and receive benefits in return, such as a discounted copy of the program when it's finished. Supporters of Zekira can also get access to the beta version of the program, and listing as a sponsor in the about box of the finished app.
Corporate sponsors of Zekira can get advertising here on Mobile Opportunity, a unique offer since I don't generally accept ads (except for one tiny Google ad that gets me access to Google's excellent traffic monitoring tools). The advertising sponsorship offer is a great way for a company that has a little bit of advertising budget left at the end of the quarter to help itself, and also help support a great product. The ad offer is limited to three companies, and is first-come, first served.
If you'd like to learn more about Zekira, you can visit our crowdfunding site here, and our website here. And here's a video of Zekira in action:
If you have feedback and suggestions for Zekira, I'd welcome your comments. And if you like the idea, please help spread the word about our crowdfunding campaign. The more support we get, the faster we can move on the project.
No matter what you think of Zekira, I hope you'll agree that the time is right for a context engine. With that and an info pad, I'd be one very happy camper.
I think what we need is a context engine, an app that helps you recall the context around any bit of information in your life. Unlike a search engine, a context engine indexes just the information in your life, and supplements your own memory. "How do I know this person?" "What's the agenda for my next meeting?" "Who sent me that article last year, and where the heck is the article?" A context engine will help you answer these questions quickly, anytime and anywhere you need the information.
The product that I'm working on, Zekira, is a first generation context engine. In this post I'll discuss the need for a context engine, how it would work, and our status with Zekira. I'll also give some information on how you can help, if you're interested.
The trouble with information overload
Information overload is a hot topic with a long history. The term was coined in the 1960s, and popularized in 1970 by Alvin Toffler's book Future Shock, according to an excellent article in Wikipedia (link). But the idea goes back further. Xerox implies that it invented information sharing through the development of the photocopier in the mid-1900s (link), And there have apparently been complaints about too much information for as long as we've had writing. The Bible complains about the proliferation of books, the Romans worried about it, and so did the ancient Chinese. Once Gutenberg got going with movable type, the complaints increased (link).
Information overload is a popular subject online. The Wall Street Journal said Google returned 2.92 million hits for it in 2009; the same search today returns 3.76 million, an increase of about 770 references per day.
Prominent authorities opinig on the hazards of information overload include the New York Times (link), Wired (link), and none other than the big consultancy McKinsey, which says it is "killing productivity...and making us unhappy" (link).
The critics of information overload complain that it bombards people with so much data that they are stunned into stupidity. They become low-grade data zombies, incapable of making intelligent decisions.
The answer, we're told, is to take in less information. The experts tell us to delete e-mails and limit our exposure to information online so that we can reserve time for thinking deep thoughts and forming long-term memories.
Okay. It makes sense that we should set aside time to think. But I believe distraction isn't a function of how much information you bring in, it's a function of how much self-discipline you lack. There's always something you can distract yourself with; if it's not e-mail it'll be Angry Birds. You could have the same problem if you had five e-mails a day or five hundred.
I think blaming "information overload" for the problem of distracted people is like blaming "water overload" for the problem of drowning. The fact is, modern society runs on the flow of information. The more information you can handle, the more productive you'll be, and the further you'll go in your career. Given the way the economy works, telling people to limit their information flow is a little like telling them to make themselves stupid. Instead, I think, we should be increasing our ability to manage that information, so we can be more productive.
The real problem is memory overload
Once you step back from demonizing information itself, it's easier to identify the problems that we have in dealing with so much information. I think the biggest problem in information management today is the limitation of human memory.
Think about how you remember things. It's usually through associations -- I saw it in the newspaper when I was at that cafe, I read it in that article on The Register while I was riding the bus, etc. When people have more information to remember than their brains can hold onto, those chains of association start to break down. You remember the fact that you once knew something, but can't recall the information itself.
As I talk with busy knowledge workers -- the type of people who manage the most information -- I hear stories about half-remembered information all the time. You'll see a person and know that you've met them, but can't recall the details about how you know them or what you discussed with them. Or a topic will come up and you'll remember that you read something important about it, but you won't recall where you saw it or how you could find that information again.
Often you know the information is stored somewhere on a computer or smartphone or website, but you have no way to look for it in the moment you need it. Even if you remember to look up the information later, it's usually extremely hard to find, and you can't take the time to do it.
The more successful you become in your career, the more information you have, and the more overloaded your memory gets. Of course it eventually overflows. The problem is so ubiquitous that most of us don't even think of it as a problem; it's just a feature of life. We shrug it off as a "senior moment" and uneasily move on.
But it has nothing to do with age; it's a function of experience. Take all the information held by a mid-career professional and stuff it into a 20-year-old's head and he or she will have the same problems.
When you add up all those "senior moments" across all the people they happen to, they constitute a huge loss in productivity among the busiest and most pivotal people in the economy. The only reason we tolerate this situation is because we assume there's nothing we can do about it.
But I think we can. The combination of mobile technology, low-cost computer storage, and web services makes it possible to build what I call a context engine -- an app designed specifically to help you recall the information in your life, and all the context around it.
You'll use a context engine to quickly recall:
-All the details of your relationship with someone -- how you met them, messages and documents you've exchanged, and meetings you've been in together.
-The backstory to a meeting, including the messages that led up to it, attendees, notes and pictures you took during the meeting, and followup messages afterward.
-A tweet or Facebook post or e-mail you saw months ago mentioning a great new restaurant that you want to try.
-That report sent to you five years ago by some guy you met at a half-remembered conference in Boston.
How the context engine will work
A context engine needs to do three things with your information: Collect, connect, and communicate.
1. Collect. To build a map of all your information, the context engine needs to gather it from all the places where your information is stored. That means, first, scanning the hard drives and other storage devices connected to your personal computer. E-mails, contacts, and meeting records all need to be extracted from whatever messaging and calendar system you use. For most mid-career professionals, that means digging into old Microsoft Outlook archives, called PST files. Other documents -- especially presentations and word processing files -- need to be sucked in as well, along with the most ubiquitous file format in business and academics, the PDF.
But you can't stop with the PC. The context engine needs to reach out to your web apps, to extract things like gMail messages, tweets, and Facebook posts and contacts. And the information on your smartphone needs to be included, everything from contacts to text messages to pictures.
This process should be automatic and comprehensive. Everything should be indexed. You shouldn't be asked to choose which files you want to remember, because you can't know in advance what you'll need.
2. Connect. Once all that information has been collected, it must be organized. That means indexing it not just by keywords, the way we would for a traditional web search, but by all of its attributes, including date, time, location, type of content, and so on.
This is a key difference between a web search engine and a context engine. In web searches, we look almost exclusively for keywords, and we use the wisdom of crowds to determine which matches are most important. That works great for searches of publicly-available content, but it breaks down when searching your personal archive. You may not remember the right keyword for a document or message, and the wisdom of crowds is much less useful for ranking results, because everyone's context is unique. Instead, a context engine needs to offer many search paths through the archive, so people can search using whatever bits of information they do remember about a topic.
The context engine should also present information to you in a way that lets you jump between bits of related data. Say you're looking for the record of a lunch meeting. You might be looking for it because you want to find the name of the person you met with, or some messages you exchanged with that person. Or maybe you just want the name of the restaurant so you can eat there again. All of that information needs to be cued up so you can jump to it easily. Again, the goal is to help you re-create those half-remembered chains of association.
Many of the products that in the past have tried to organize personal information (such as Google Desktop) have mimicked the keyword-centric searching we do on the web. Web search is so ubiquitous that we're all a bit like the man with the proverbial hammer -- every problem looks like a nail. But I think personal context requires a radically different structure to the database and UI. It's not about searching for things, it's about navigating through your context.
3. Communicate. You don't know when you'll need to remember something, so the context engine needs to be available on your mobile devices. In particular, I think a context engine is a killer app for tablets in business. Imagine always having your entire information history at your fingertips in every meeting and every conversation. How much more productive could you be if you had a perfect memory all day long?
I can't tell you how many people in Silicon Valley have told me sheepishly that they don't know what to do with their iPads at work. They generally love them at home, where they access entertainment and informational content. But at the office, particularly in meetings, they tend to turn into tools for covertly checking messages and browsing when the meeting gets slow. Please don't misunderstand, I know there are many things you can do with an iPad. But I'm reporting what I hear from a lot of iPad users.
Far be it from me to judge the way others fill their time, but I think the context engine would give you a good business reason to carry your tablet all day.
That means the database needs to be hosted in the cloud, which creates all sorts of important security challenges. Having your extended memory hacked is utterly unacceptable.
Building the context engine
As you know if you've been following my earlier updates, the startup that I'm working on, Zekira, is building a context engine. The company consists of four engineers plus myself, and we've been working on it for more than a year. Zekira is the fulfillment of a dream for us. One of us, Rudi Diezmann, has been working on personal search products since the 1980s. Others of us first thought about this problem when we were working at Palm almost ten years ago. We were looking at user problems a PDA or smartphone could solve, beyond helping you manage your calendar and contacts. There was a group of customers who responded very strongly to any product that could help them recall information and the context around it.
But only recently have mobile computers and wireless networks become powerful enough to let you build a full-function context engine.
The first version of Zekira is in early beta. It runs on Macs and PCs, and right now it indexes information found on your computer and any storage attached to it. Our goal is to take Zekira mobile, and to add web data sources, as soon as possible. But we did the first version on personal computers so we could get started testing the database and search capability. Besides, there are a lot of people with old Outlook and Office archives who would be happy to turn a context engine loose on them.
Zekira gives you a little search window that you can leave up on the screen, or minimize:
After you do a search, your results appear in this window:
The four stacks in the center show you all the items that matched your current search. In this case, we're seeing things related to Tom Shannon, including documents that he wrote or that mention his name, messages you've exchanged with him, and his contact record. Click on any of those items and you'll see information related to them.
The tabs on the left are filters that let you narrow the search. Currently they let you search by time/date (the filter shown), name, word, document type, and folder:
You can combine multiple filters to do complex layered searches. The filters are extensible, and we plan to add additional search tools in the future.
We're doing a crowdfunding campaign for Zekira on the funding website Indiegogo. If you don't know how crowdfunding works, people can make small financial contributions to a project and receive benefits in return, such as a discounted copy of the program when it's finished. Supporters of Zekira can also get access to the beta version of the program, and listing as a sponsor in the about box of the finished app.
Corporate sponsors of Zekira can get advertising here on Mobile Opportunity, a unique offer since I don't generally accept ads (except for one tiny Google ad that gets me access to Google's excellent traffic monitoring tools). The advertising sponsorship offer is a great way for a company that has a little bit of advertising budget left at the end of the quarter to help itself, and also help support a great product. The ad offer is limited to three companies, and is first-come, first served.
If you'd like to learn more about Zekira, you can visit our crowdfunding site here, and our website here. And here's a video of Zekira in action:
If you have feedback and suggestions for Zekira, I'd welcome your comments. And if you like the idea, please help spread the word about our crowdfunding campaign. The more support we get, the faster we can move on the project.
No matter what you think of Zekira, I hope you'll agree that the time is right for a context engine. With that and an info pad, I'd be one very happy camper.
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